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Liberty, Justice... and Experts For All*
Mary F. Moriarty"
Learned Hand once said, "If we are to keep our democracy,
there must be one commandment: Thou shalt not ration justice."'
Yet we ration justice when we deny criminal defendants access to
the tools of an effective defense because they are poor. This hap-
pens when federal and state statutes give judges the discretion to
allocate a limited amount of compensation to investigators and ex-
perts for use in the defense of indigents accused of crimes. A law-
yer who represents a poor client must ask the trial judge to
authorize funds for investigators and experts. Even if the judge
authorizes the full amount of money available under the statute, it
is often insufficient to prepare an adequate defense. Because these
statutes limit access to the investigators and experts necessary to
present a defense, they effectively deprive poor defendants of due
process under the fourteenth amendment. The statutes also com-
promise the indigent defendant's sixth amendment right to con-
frontation when they prevent effective cross-examination because
funds are not available to consult with an investigator or expert.
Finally, these statutes impair the autonomy of the defense lawyer
and the integrity of the adversarial system when judges use them
as a license to interfere with defense strategy.
I. The Need for Investigators and Experts
If investigators and experts were not necessary to prepare an
effective criminal defense, any debate over the merits of these stat-
utes would be superfluous. There is general agreement that inves-
tigators and experts are important.2 In 1956, Judge Jerome Frank
wrote:
This article is dedicated to the memory of Professor Irving Younger.
J.D. 1989, University of Minnesota Law School; B.A. 1986, Macalester Col-
lege. Professor Judith T. Younger contributed invaluable advice and insight.
1. Address by Learned Hand, Legal Aid Society of New York 75th Anniver-
sary Dinner (Feb. 16, 1951).
2. There are some dissenters. See Norman Lefstein, Criminal Defense Serv-
ices For The Poor 37-38 (May 1982). In a survey of indigent defense systems in San
Francisco, Lefstein found that many judges view investigators and experts as a low
priority. Lefstein reported that public defenders are often discouraged from re-
questing investigators and experts because their applications are frequently denied.
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The best lawyer in the world cannot competently defend an
accused person if the lawyer cannot obtain existing evidence
crucial to the defense, e.g., if the defendant cannot pay the fee
of an investigator to find a pivotal missing witness or a neces-
sary document, or that of an expert accountant or mining engi-
neer or chemist.... In such circumstances, if the government
does not supply the funds, justice is denied the poor-and repre-
sents but an upper-bracket privilege.3
The American Bar Association agrees. Its comprehensive
standards for case preparation include the use of investigators and
experts. Under ABA Standard 4-4.1, a defense lawyer must con-
duct a prompt investigation of all circumstances surrounding each
case and explore any avenue that might uncover a relevant fact.
4
Even the client's admission of guilt will not relieve the lawyer of
the responsibility to investigate because the act conimitted by the
defendant may not coincide with the elements of the crime.5 The
comment to this standard says simply, "Facts form the basis of ef-
fective representation."' 6 To gather these essential facts, the law-
yer must conduct a thorough investigation. Only by locating
witnesses and learning as much as possible about their character
and background will a lawyer be able to take advantage of cross-
examination. 7
To use these facts effectively, the lawyer may have to consult
an expert to educate himself8 about scientific evidence or to ap-
pear as a defense witness. ABA Standard 5-1.4 states that experts
and investigators must be available at trial, and at any other phase
of the proceeding where they are necessary.9 According to the
ABA drafters, quality representation is wasted at trial without the
benefit of necessary supporting services.10
Preparation is the cornerstone of effective advocacy.1 And
3. United States v. Johnson, 238 F.2d 565, 572 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissent-
ing), vacated, 352 U.S. 565 (1957). See also H.R. Rep. No. 864, reprinted in 1964 U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin. News 2990, 2993. In a letter to House Speaker John McCor-
mack, President John F. Kennedy wrote of the urgent need for the Criminal Jus-
tice Act of 1964: "Whenever the lack of money prevents a defendant from securing
an experienced lawyer, trained investigator or technical expert, an unjust convic-
tion may follow." Id.





8. I use masculine pronouns in this article for style and simplicity, not to ex-
clude or discriminate against women. For further discussion, see Irving Younger,
The English Language is Sez-Neutral, 72 A.B.A. J. 89 (1986).
9. ABA Standard 5-1.4, supra note 4.
10. Id. comment.
11. Recently, Edward Bennett Williams commented, "It's been said a thousand
[Vol. 6:247
1988] LIBERTY, JUSTICE... AND EXPERTS FOR ALL 249
an effective advocate must be an able direct and cross-examiner.
To accomplish this task, the diligent lawyer will prepare before
the trial begins with one theory of the case in mind.12 Any evi-
dence introduced by the lawyer at trial develops a narrative
around that theme, and cross-examination, if done at all, merely
elicits the information he needs to deliver an effective surnma-
tion.13 The author of a recent article in Litigation wrote that in-
terviewing adverse witnesses before trial is imperative. 14 In his
opinion, meticulous preparation enables the lawyer to effectively
develop cross-examination, and to preclude improper or damaging
testimony entirely via a motion in limine.'5
Federal courts take the same view. In United States v. Pat-
terson,16 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the defend-
ant was entitled to retain a fingerprint analyst after fingerprint
evidence had been introduced against him. A defense expert was
required, according to the court, because "[t]he assistance of an ex-
pert undoubtedly would have facilitated Patterson's cross-exami-
nation of the government's expert." 17
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed a conviction in
United States v. Sloan 18 after the trial court denied the defend-
ant's request to be examined by a psychiatrist of his own choice.
Although a state doctor had examined Sloan, the court held that a
non-partisan expert failed to satisfy the requirements of due
process:
The essential benefit of having an expert in the first place is
denied the defendant when the services of the doctor must be
times - the secret of great trial work is preparation, really tedious, really intense
preparation.... I could go on doing trial work until I was 89 years old, if I didn't
have to prepare the case with this terrible, torturous physical and psychic discipline
you have to impose upon yourself." Priscilla Anne Schwab, Interview with Edward
Bennett Williams, Litigation, Winter 1986, at 28-29. Irving Younger said of
preparation:
The chief, the central principle of advocacy, in all its parts and in
every aspect, is preparation. Preparation. Preparation. Whether he
has one week, one month, or one year to prepare, the advocate concen-
trates upon his case to the exclusion of everything else .... To what
end? That nothing come as a surprise. Everything at trial must be an-
ticipated. Because if it is not, it will go wrong.
Irving Younger, A Letter in Which Cicero Lays Down the Ten Commandments of
Cross-Examination, Litigation, Winter 1977, at 18.
12. James W. McElhaney, The Story Line In Cross-Examination, Litigation,
Fall 1982, at 45.
13. Id.
14. David Berg, Cross-Examination, Litigation, Fall 1987, at 25.
15. Id. at 27.
16. 724 F.2d 1128 (5th Cir. 1984).
17. Id. at 1131.
18. 776 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1985).
Law and Inequality
shared with the prosecution. In this case, the benefit sought
was not only the testimony of a psychiatrist to present the de-
fendant's side of the case, but also the assistance of an expert
to interpret the findings of an expert witness and to aid in the
preparation of his cross-examination. Without that assistance,
the defendant was deprived of the fair trial due process
demands. 19
Not only must indigent defendants have investigators and ex-
perts, they must be able to choose their own. When it determined
that the trial judge erred in denying the defendant a ballistics ex-
pert, the Massachusetts Court of Appeals noted, "The judge does
not appear to have considered the likelihood that a solvent defend-
ant.. .would prefer to select and employ a competent expert of
demonstrated credibility rather than rely on the testimony of a po-
lice criminalist of undisclosed qualifications who might well be a
hostile witness."20 One court has gone so far as to hold that the
failure of the defense lawyer to seek money for an expert was re-
versible error. In Loe v. United States,2 1 the court held that coun-
sel's failure to obtain a private psychiatric examination of the
defendant rendered his defense ineffective because the defendant
was deprived of the partisan expert to which he was entitled.
Some judges insist that investigators and experts who work
for the local police or the state are an adequate substitute for par-
tisans. Unfortunately, these judges use the supporting service stat-
utes to impose "neutral" experts and investigators on the defense,
even though the United States Supreme Court has said, "[t]he very
premise of our adversary system of criminal justice is that partisan
advocacy on both sides of a case will best promote the ultimate ob-
jective that the guilty be convicted and the innocent go free."22
Justice Cardozo recognized that partisan experts play an essential
role in our adversarial system when he noted that a defendant
may be "[a]t an unfair disadvantage, if he is unable because of pov-
erty to parry by his own [expert] witnesses the thrusts of those
against him."23 Partisan advocacy can only be accomplished when
the defense can choose those investigators and experts who will
best promote the indigent defendant's interests. 24
19. Id. at 929.
20. Commonwealth v. Bolduc, 411 N.E.2d 483, 486 (Mass. App. Ct. 1980).
21. 545 F.Supp. 662 (E.D.Va. 1982).
22. Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853, 862 (1975).
23. Reilly v. Berry, 166 N.E. 165, 167 (1929).
24. See Note, Expert Services And The Indigent Criminal Defendan" The Con-
stitutional Mandate of Ake v. Oklahoma, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1326, 1356 (1986). The
author argues that a partisan expert, one who exclusively assists the defense, is
constitutionally mandated and essential to due process. In his opinion, the use of
neutral experts "subverts the adversary system by shifting the decision from the
[Vol. 6:247
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While imposing police investigators and state experts on the
defense would save the county a few dollars, the long-term cost to
the system will be greater. Many police officers have the ability to
do an adequate investigation, but because they usually work for
the prosecution they will see the case from that perspective. Crim-
inal defendants, however, need investigators who can recognize
facts that may be woven into an effective theory of the defense. In
the opinion of the chief public defender of the largest urban
county in Minnesota, who uses former police officers as staff inves-
tigators, it takes approximately six months for them to become
able defense investigators.2 5 Similar problems arise with experts.
Those experts consulted by the prosecution work for the state,
which is trying to convict the defendant of a crime. Like police of-
ficers, experts employed by the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Ap-
prehension see the case from the prosecution's point of view. Thus,
when judges refuse to authorize funds for partisan experts and in-
vestigators, the defendant has forced upon him supporting services
insensitive to the subtleties of defense work. Since partisan inves-
tigators and experts are an essential component of the adversarial
system, judges should not view the role of these professionals as
"[e]ssentially that of a disinterested factfinder, rather than one
whose job is to help the defense to the extent compatible with pro-
fessional standards."26
II. The Statutes
Though the language varies from state to state, most statutes
require prior approval of expenditures by the court and many es-
tablish strict monetary ceilings.27 A majority of states authorize
funds for experts "necessary" to an adequate defense, 28 but the
difficulty arises in the courts' interpretation of that language.
Even though most state legislatures incorporate some variation of
the word "necessary" into their statutes, the courts do not agree on
its meaning.
By statute, an indigent accused of a crime in North Carolina
jury (or judge) to the expert." Id. at 1349. Because our adversarial system places
great trust in the ability of the jury to evaluate the credibility of any witness, in-
cluding the expert, the defendant should be allowed to participate in the "battle of
the experts" and have the jury decide whose opinion is more credible. See Id.
25. Interview with William R. Kennedy, Chief Public Defender of Hennepin
County, in Minneapolis, Minnesota (Oct. 6, 1987). Kennedy said that preparing a
case without the benefit of an investigator was like "trying to play golf with one
arm.",
26. Note, supra note 24, at 1356.
27. For a complete listing of pertinent state law, see Appendix.
28. Id.
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is entitled to all necessary expenses of representation and a rela-
tionship with his lawyer similar to that which he would enjoy with
privately retained counsel.29 In State v. Cauthen,30 however, the
court held that a defendant must show a reasonable likelihood
that expert assistance will materially assist the defense. The court
wrote that "[a] defendant's constitutional right to effective assist-
ance of counsel does not require that the State 'furnish a defend-
ant with a particular service simply because the service might be
of some benefit to his defense.' "31 This decision is peculiar in light
of the North Carolina Legislature's intent that indigent defendants
have similar resources for representation as defendants who can
afford private counsel. The opinion is also at odds with another
court's interpretation of a similar statute. A federal district court
in Nebraska wrote that the judge need only be satisfied that de-
fense services are reasonably necessary "to assist counsel in their
preparation, not that the defense would be defective without such
testimony."3 2
In Kentucky, an indigent defendant is entitled to the neces-
sary services of representation including "investigation and other
preparation."3 3 The State's courts, however, have not been partic-
ularly receptive to defense requests for investigators and experts.
The state supreme court wrote, "[We know of no statute or princi-
ple which would authorize expenditures of public funds to conduct
a witch hunt."34 This was its response to the trial court's denial of
a defense lawyer's request for money to collect more data on the
improper selection of grand and petit jurors. An expert had found
a statistically significant underrepresentation of young people and
women in the jury pool and needed more money to gather similar
data on race.3 5 On appeal, the Commonwealth framed the issue as
a request for a second statistician, and that was the question the
supreme court chose to address.3 6 The case went to federal court,
where the Commonwealth withdrew its improper characterization
of the issue, admitting it was "careless phrasing."37
A defendant was convicted and sentenced to death in Korden-
29. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-450 (1987).
30. 311 S.E.2d 649 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984).
31. Id. at 651 (quoting State v. Parton, 277 S.E.2d 410, 418 (N.C. 1981)).
32. United States v. Pope, 251 F.Supp. 234, 241 (D.Neb. 1966).
33. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31.110 (Mitchie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985).
34. Ford v. Commonwealth, 665 S.W.2d 304, 309 (Ky. 1983), cert denied, 469
U.S. 984 (1984).
35. Edward C. Monahan, Obtaining Funds for the Defense of Indigents Accused
of Crimes 8 (1987) [hereinafter Monahan].
36. Id. at 8.
37. Id. at 9.
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brock v. Commonwealth,38 another Kentucky case, without the
testimony of the psychiatrist who examined him before trial.
Although the trial court granted the defendant Kordenbrock's re-
quest to retain the psychiatrist, the fiscal court, which is responsi-
ble for the appropriation of county funds,39 refused to pay the
expert's bill. When the psychiatrist refused to testify until he was
paid for his pre-trial work, the defense was forced to try the case
without expert testimony on the defendant's state of mind and
other factors that might have mitigated the sentence.40 On appeal,
the court recognized the defendant's right to expert assistance that
was "reasonably necessary," but held that the issues on which the
psychiatrist was prepared to testify were not relevant to the de-
fense.41 Before the Kordenbrock decision, the United States
Supreme Court held in Ake v. Oklahoma 42 that the state denied
an indigent defendant due process by refusing to supply him with
a psychiatrist during his trial and sentencing. Yet the Korden-
brock court wrote, "We do not have an Ake v. Oklahoma... situa-
tion here.... [A] defendant in a case such as this has [no] right to
a psychiatric fishing expedition at public expense, or an in-depth
analysis on matters irrelevant to a legal defense to the crime." 43
A court in Florida saw a similar case in a different light. To
gain access to an investigator or expert in that state, a defendant
must show that the expert's opinion is relevant to the issues in the
case. 44 In Perri v. State,45 the Florida Supreme Court held that
the trial court's denial of psychiatric assistance to the defense dur-
ing sentencing in a capital case required a new sentencing hearing.
Even though Perri did not rely on an insanity defense, he was enti-
tled to present expert testimony on factors that might reduce his
sentence. 46 His testimony before sentencing that he had, at one
time, been in a mental institution was sufficient to allow his law-
38. 700 S.W.2d 384 (Ky. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1153 (1986).
39. Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 67.080 (Mitchie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985) (the fiscal court
of each county is responsible for appropriating county funds); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 67.040 (Mitchie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985) (the fiscal court of each county is comprised
of the county judge/executive and three county commissioners).
40. The defense intended to present testimony on the defendant's state of mind
at the time of the crime and his confession, the influence of drugs, whether the de-
fendant could be rehabilitated, the effect of a severe motorcycle accident, the effect
of military service and other factors that might have saved him from the death pen-
alty. Kordenbrock, 700 S.W.2d at 387.
41. Id.
42. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
43. Kordenbrock, 700 S.W.2d at 387.
44. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 914.06 (West 1985 & Supp. 1988).
45. 441 So.2d 606 (Fla. 1983).
46. Id. at 608-09.
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yer to consult an expert.47 Since both courts applied the same stat-
utory language to similar factual situations, it is inconsistent that
one defendant received the death penalty while the other got a
new sentencing hearing.
Courts in other jurisdictions have twisted the "reasonably
necessary" standard in a variety of ways. An indigent defendant in
Kansas may have access to funds for necessary services,4a but
courts have held that denial of funds for an investigator was not
reversible error when the defense lawyer was unable to estimate
the amount of money needed.49 An Ohio judge will apply a bal-
ancing test to determine whether expert assistance is "reasonably
necessary" for proper representation. 50 Using this test, the court
must balance the value of expert assistance at trial and sentencing
against the availability of other devices fulfilling the same
function.51
Even when the court approves the highest amount of money
allowed by statute, it is often insufficient to fashion an effective
defense. Several states put specific monetary limits on investiga-
tive and expert service expenses. Three hundred dollars is the
maximum amount in Minnesota52 and New Hampshire;5 3 two hun-
dred and fifty dollars is the limit in Illinois.M In response to criti-
cism that two hundred and fifty dollars was unrealistic, the
Supreme Court of Illinois responded that the ceiling was never
meant to be a "rigid upper boundary" but that requests for more
money "should be scrutinized for abuse with special care."55
Those states that do not provide an explicit monetary ceiling au-
thorize the court to determine "reasonable" compensation for ex-
pert services.56
Ill. The Federal and Minnesota Statutes
The language of the federal statute is virtually identical to
many state statutes. A great deal more legislative history is avail-
able for the federal statute because it was part of the highly publi-
cized Criminal Justice Act of 1964. Though many states used the
federal statute as a model, there is little state legislative history.
47. Id. at 609.
48. Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4508 (1981 & Supp. 1987).
49. See, e.g., United States v. Frideaux, 487 P.2d 541 (1971).
50. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2929.02.4 (Anderson 1987).
51. See, e.g., State v. Jenkins, 473 N.E.2d 264, 292 (Ohio 1984).
52. Minn. Stat. § 611.21 (1986).
53. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 604-A:B (1986).
54. Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 38, para. 113-3 (Smith-Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1988).
55. People v. Kinion, 454 N.E.2d 625, 631 (I1. 1983).
56. See Appendix.
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Thus, it is useful to look at the legislative history and judicial in-
terpretation of the federal statute to see how state courts should
view similar state statutes. Since the language of the Minnesota
statute is prototypical of its state counterparts and closely mirrors
the federal statute, it will be the primary focus of this section.5 7
The state of Minnesota is divided into ten judicial districts,
each employing public defenders to represent indigents.U Every
year the chief public defender of each district submits a budget to
the State Board of Public Defense for approval.59 Although the
Board has the last word on the budget, money authorized for ex-
pert expenses comes directly from the county in which the prose-
cution originated.8 0 When there is not enough money in the
district budget to hire staff investigators or experts, public defend-
ers must rely on the statute for funds to retain supporting services.
Indigents represented by private counsel may avail themselves of
the statute's benefits as well.61
Investigators and experts may be obtained under Minn. Stat.
§ 611.21 when they are ". . . necessary to an adequate defense
57. Minn. Stat. § 611.21 (1986) provides:
Counsel, whether or not appointed by the court, for a defendant who
is financially unable to obtain investigative, expert, or other services
necessary to an adequate defense in the case may request them in an
ex parte application. Upon finding, after appropriate inquiry in an ex
parte proceeding, that the services are necessary and that the defend-
ant is financially unable to obtain them, the court shall authorize
counsel to obtain the services on behalf of the defendant. The court
may establish a limit on the amount which may be expended or prom-
ised for such services. The court may, in the interests of justice, and
upon a finding that timely procurement of necessary services could not
await prior authorization, ratify such services after they have been ob-
tained, but such ratification shall be given only in unusual situations.
The court shall determine reasonable compensation for the services
and direct payment by the county in which the prosecution originated,
to the organization or person who rendered them, upon the filing of a
claim for compensation supported by an affidavit specifying the time
expended, services rendered, and expenses incurred on behalf of the
defendant, and the compensation received in the same case or for the
same services from any other source. The compensation to be paid to
a person for such service rendered to a defendant under this section,
or to be paid to an organization for such services rendered by an em-
ployee thereof, shall not exceed $300, exclusive of reimbursement for
expenses reasonably incurred.
58. Indigent defendants may also be represented by private counsel. Expenses
for investigators and experts authorized by the statute are available to indigent de-
fendants who obtain private counsel. Minn. Stat. § 611.21 (1986).
59. Interview with Judge Kevin S. Burke, Hennepin County District Court, in
Minneapolis, Minnesota (Oct. 2, 1987). Judge Burke is chair of the Minnesota State
Board of Public Defense. The board consists of seven members.
60. Minn. Stat. § 611.21 (1986).
61. See also English v. Missildine, 311 N.W.2d 292 (Iowa 1981). An Iowa court
held that the sixth amendment required money for investigative services to indi-
gent defendants even if they are represented by private counsel.
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.... "62 After an ex parte application from defense counsel,63 the
judge must find the services "necessary" to authorize payment of
expenses, not to exceed three hundred dollars.64 Only in unusual
situations, where time is of the essence, will the court approve
compensation for services obtained before application to the
court.6 5 Judges attempting to discover the nature of what is neces-
sary to an adequate defense will find little solace in the criteria set
forth in the statute. And unfortunately, no Minnesota court has
enlightened the legal community with a workable definition of
what is "necessary." As one might imagine, some judges view very
little as necessary to a criminal defendant.
No state or federal court has successfully articulated those el-
ements fundamental to the defense of every indigent; most insist
that a case-by-case analysis is necessary.66 Many federal courts in-
terpreting similar language in 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e), 67 have liber-
ally construed the statute. In United States v. Schultz,68 the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the defendant's robbery
conviction because the lower court refused to authorize funds for
independent psychiatric services to assist in preparing an insanity
defense. Not satisfied with the statutory definition of "necessary,"
the court turned instead to the legislative history.6 9 In a report on
the supporting services section of the Criminal Justice Act the
Senate Subcommittee wrote, "[W]e feel that the bar should be bold
in seeking subsection (e) authorizations and the bench should be
tolerant in entertaining and relatively generous in granting
them."70 Judge Bright then wrote in Schultz:
62. Minn. Stat. § 611.21 (1986).
63. An ex parte hearing is essential because the defense is required to reveal
strategy. When defense counsel objects to the presence of government counsel dur-
ing a request for investigators or experts, failure to hold an ex parte hearing is prej-
udicial error. United States v. Sutton, 464 F.2d 552 (5th Cir. 1972). See also Mason
v. State of Arizona, 504 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 936 (1975).
In Mason, the appellate court would not rule on the absence of an ex parte hearing
because defense counsel did not object at trial.
64. Minn. Stat. § 611.21 (1986).
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., United States v. Theriault, 440 F.2d 713 (5th Cir. 1971).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) provides:
Upon request, counsel for a person who is financially unable to obtain
investigative, expert, or other services necessary for an adequate de-
fense may request them in an ex parte application. Upon finding, after
appropriate inquiry in an ex parte proceeding, that the services are
necessary and that the person is financially unable to obtain them, the
court, or the United States magistrate if the services are required in
connection with a matter over which he has jurisdiction, shall author-
ize counsel to obtain the services.
68. 431 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1970).
69. Id. at 911.
70. Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
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While a trial court need not authorize an expenditure under
subdivision (e) for a mere 'fishing expedition', it should not
withhold its authority when underlying facts reasonably sug-
gest that further exploration may prove beneficial to the ac-
cused in the development of a defense to the charge. 71
In theory this interpretation seems reasonable. In practice it is
not. Since the determination of what is necessary is left to the
considerable discretion of the trial court, what is reasonable to one
judge may be a "fishing expedition" to another. The appellate
courts' unwillingness to substitute their judgments for those of the
trial courts worsens this problem.
Thus, a defendant facing a guilty verdict usually encounters a
brick wall trying to convince an appellate court that the denial of
investigative or expert funds was reversible error. In Mason v.
State of Arizona,72 a federal court held that a defendant must
show, by clear and convincing evidence, that he was substantially
prejudiced by the trial court's denial of investigative funds. To
prepare its case against Mason, the state interviewed twenty-three
witnesses. When Mason's lawyer asked for an investigator, his re-
quest was refused because he would not tell the judge what lines
of inquiry he intended to pursue or why he could not personally
conduct the interviews.7 3 Though the court cited Schultz for the
liberal construction of requests for pre-trial assistance, it clung to
the clear and convincing standard of review and affirmed the
conviction.74
In a 1986 revision of the Criminal Justice Act, Congress rec-
ognized that judicial discretion over allocation of funds was but
one problem with these statutes. Critics saw several difficulties
with the statute in 1964, though Congress did nothing to alleviate
these problems until the Act's revision in 1986. When the House
Judiciary Committee originally considered section 3006A(e) of the
Criminal Justice Act, a minority expressed concern at the estab-
lishment of arbitrary ceilings on compensation for lawyers repre-
senting indigents.7 5 They saw no justification for explicitly
limiting fees, when courts could award appropriate compensation
on a case by case basis. A flexible fee schedule was thought to be
especially important in complicated cases requiring extensive prep-
Report of the Criminal Justice Act in the Federal District Courts, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 220-21 (1969).
71. Schultz, 431 F.2d at 911.
72. 504 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1974).
73. Id. at 1354-55.
74. Id. at 1352.
75. H.R. Rep. No. 864, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in 1964 U.S. Code Cong.
& Admin. News 2990, 2996-98.
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aration, a long trial, and full appellate review.76 The issue of arbi-
trary ceilings on investigative and expert fees was not addresssed
specifically, but arguments set forth in support of flexible counsel
fees apply to investigators and experts as well. Because judges
make individualized determinations for the authorization of funds
in each case, there is no need to set an arbitrary ceiling.
Congress addressed the issue of investigative and expert com-
pensation when it revised the Criminal Justice Act in 1986. 77 In
the twenty-one years between the Act's original passage and the
1986 revision, the compensation ceiling remained at three hundred
dollars. Federal judges urged revision of the statute because they
believed the low ceiling deprived indigent defendants of their sixth
amendment right to effective representation. 78 The original three
hundred dollar limit remained, however, even though the intent of
Congress was to correct an imbalance in the adversarial system re-
sulting from the defendant's lack of resources. In 1986, realizing
that inflation required an increase in investigative and expert com-
pensation, Congress raised the limit to one thousand dollars.79
Minnesota's statute was enacted in 1965, one year after its
federal counterpart. Its three hundred dollar ceiling remains in ef-
fect.8 0 Since the statute requires judicial approval before the law-
yer may contact an investigator or expert, there is no reason to set
an inflexible ceiling on the amount a judge may authorize. Any
limit, especially one at three hundred dollars, is arbitrary and a de-
nial of due process if it deprives indigents of the basic tools they
need for an effective defense. If Minnesota continues to allow the
judiciary to exercise discretion over the defendant's use of investi-
gators and experts, the three hundred dollar ceiling should be
eliminated.
IV. Defenders of Indigents and the Adversarial System
Many state statutes reflect the idea that the professional rela-
tionship between a court-appointed lawyer and the indigent de-
fendant should be no different than that between a client and
privately retained counsel.8 1 Unfortunately, courts often give lip
76. Id. at 2998.
77. H.R. Rep. No. 99-417, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 6, reprinted in 1986 U.S. Code
Cong. & Admin. News 6165, 6178.
78. Id. at 6165.
79. Id. at 6178.
80. Minn. Stat. § 611.21 (1986).
81. See N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-16-3 (1984) ("A needy person...is entitled to be
represented by an attorney to the same extent as a person having his own coun-
sel."); Wyo. Stat. § 7-6-104 (1977) (An indigent is entitled "[t]o be represented by an
attorney to the same extent as a person having his own counsel."); Nev. Rev. Stat.
[Vol. 6:247
1988] LIBERTY, JUSTICE... AND EXPERTS FOR ALL 259
service to this legislative intent. Certainly no privately retained
lawyer would have to reveal defense strategy well before trial in
an attempt to convince a judge that effective representation rests
upon obtaining an investigator or expert. The issue of judicial in-
terference with public defenders has been a concern in Minnesota
for well over a decade.
The first in-depth evaluation of Minnesota's Public Defender
System was done in 1973. That year the Criminal Courts Techni-
cal Assistance Project released a report on the public defender sys-
tem.8 2 The lack of full-time investigators thoughout the state
emerged as the system's greatest deficiency.83 The evaluation
showed that because few districts could afford staff investigators,
most public defenders were forced to apply for authorization to re-
tain them under the Minnesota statute. Because some courts were
reluctant to authorize funds for investigators, the public defenders
simply had to do without them.
The report also concluded that local judicial control over the
selection of public defenders and supervisory regulation of their
budgets should be eliminated to insure that they could function as
independent advocates on behalf of their clients.84 In its Standards
for Criminal Justice, the American Bar Association notes:
The legal representation plan for a jurisdiction should be
designed to guarantee the integrity of the relationship between
lawyer and client. The plan and the lawyers serving under it
should be free from political influence and should be subject to
judicial supervision only in the same manner and to the same
extent as are lawyers in private practice.8 5
The drafters wrote in the comment to this section that when an
indigent's lawyer is deprived of the freedom and independence to
act on behalf of the client, it is perceived by the defendant and
causes "cynicism toward the justness of the legal system."86
The Minnesota Evaluation and the ABA Standards advocate
the elimination of judicial supervision over public defenders.
§ 260.040 (1986) ("The professional relationship between court-appointed counsel
and indigent defendants under the public defender system is no different than that
between a client and privately retained counsel. Sanchez v. Murphy, 385 F.Supp.
1362 (D. Nev. 1974)").
82. Criminal Courts Technical Assistance Project Defender Evaluation (July
1973) [hereinafter Minnesota Evaluation]. With technical assistance from the Na-
tional Legal Aid and Defender Association (NLADA), the Criminal Courts Techni-
cal Assistance Project of American University, Washington, D.C., conducted an
evaluation of the Minnesota public defender system.
83. Id. at 52.
84. Id. at 53.
85. ABA Standard 5-1.3, supra note 4.
86. Id. at 5-1.5.
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Many state statutes reflect the idea that the lawyer's professional
obligations to an indigent remain the same as those to a paying cli-
ent.8 7 Yet these same statutes impose judicial supervision on the
selection of investigators and experts, placing the indigent's lawyer
in the position of having to justify defense strategy. Since lawyers
in private practice are not subject to similar scrutiny, public de-
fenders should not have to endure it either. If the law intends to
give indigent defendants the same opportunity to present a de-
fense, their lawyers ought not be subject to judicial whim.
The Minnesota public defender system has improved since
the results of the evaluation were released in 1973, yet some
problems persist. There were no full-time staff investigators in
Minnesota's Fifth Judicial District when the results of the report
were published.8 8 Although the consultants recommended the ad-
dition of two full-time investigative positions in 1973, none exist to-
day.89 In the Ninth Judicial District, which is comprised of
seventeen counties, there is only one full-time investigator.90 That
district has taken one remedial step; the creation of an internship
program in which college students do part-time investigation for
credit toward graduation. 91 While this program is helpful, nothing
can really take the place of a trained full-time defense
investigator.
Even the districts which have funds to hire investigators
struggle to find experts and pay for their services. Experts in
fields relevant to criminal law often work near large cities or uni-
versities and are not readily available to aid in the defense of indi-
gents in rural Minnesota.9 2 If they are to participate in the
defense of indigents in rural areas, they have to be compensated
not only for their time but for travel expenses as well. Several
years ago, the Ninth Judicial District retained an expert in pediat-
ric neurology at a total cost of over $10,000.93 His travel expenses
were considerable, but with the neurologist's help the defendant
was acquitted of second degree manslaughter.94
87. Minnesota Evaluation, supra note 82.
88. Id. at 39.
89. Telephone interview with Calvin Johnson, Chief Public Defender of Minne-
sota's Fifth Judicial District (Nov. 4, 1987).
90. Telephone interview with Paul A. Kief, Chief Public Defender of Minne-
sota's Ninth Judicial District (Apr. 24, 1988).
91. Id.
92. Telephone interview with Fred T. Friedman, Chief Public Defender of Min-
nesota's Sixth Judicial District (Apr. 14, 1988).
93. Letter from Paul A. Kief to Mary Moriarty (Apr. 26, 1988) (on file with
Law & Inequality). The case was State v. Stein Haynes, No. 85-189 (Sept. 14, 1985).
94. Id. The expert was retained to prepare the public defender and to testify at
trial. The first trial resulted in a hung jury, the second in an acquittal.
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Prosecutors in the same districts have unlimited access to po-
lice investigators and experts provided by the Minnesota Bureau of
Criminal Apprehension (BCA).95 The BCA, a state approximation
of the FBI, furnishes experts in handwriting, blood, fingerprinting,
glass fragments, firearms, tool marks, fibers, and other methods of
laboratory analysis to prosecutors on request.96 If local law en-
forcement officials ask for help to investigate a crime, the BCA
will send a special agent who has had at least four years of investi-
gatory experience.9 7 Such an imbalance in resources places indi-
gents' lawyers in an unenviable position. They must try to prepare
a defense based on three hundred dollars worth of expert assist-
ance matched against the unlimited resources of the prosecution.
Many commentators, including those who conducted the Min-
nesota Evaluation, argue that relieving the counties of the burden
of indigent defense funding would curb some abuse.9 8 In 1982, the
ABA's Standing Committee on Legal Aid and Indigent Defendants
conducted a hearing on indigent defense funding.99 Those who tes-
tified agreed that state financing was more viable than funding
through counties, which are often seriously underfunded.100 Too
many problems arise when county officials, concerned with shrink-
ing budgets and rising costs, resort to alternatives such as contract
defense systems.l0 1 In a contract system, lawyers submit bids from
which the county selects those who will serve as public defenders.
Often, the county will contract with the lowest bidder, who will
work for a flat rate. 0 2 Since public defenders in a contract system
are not paid by the hour, some avoid trials completely and attempt
to cut back hours when they reach their estimate. Others subcon-
tract with recent law school graduates who are willing to work for
95. The state legislature established the Bureau of Criminal Apprehension on
July 1, 1927. It functions somewhat like the FBI but at the state level. Telephone
interview with Floyd Roman, Assistant Superintendent of the BCA (Apr. 4, 1988).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. American Bar Association in cooperation with the National Legal Aid and
Defender Association, Gideon Undone: The Crisis in Indigent Defense Funding 8,
17 (1982) [hereinafter Gideon Undone].
99. Id. at 2.
100. Id. at 8, 17. In a summary and overview of the hearing, Sheldon Portman
reported that the cost of criminal defense services for indigent defendants consti-
tutes only 1.5% of total expenditures for criminal justice matters by state and local
governments. State financing was seen as more viable because counties are gener-
ally underfunded and opt for systems other than the public defender. Although
these alternatives may save money, the quality of those defense services leaves
much to be desired. Id. at 1.
101. Id. at 1. See also Robert Spangenberg, A.D. Davis & P.A. Smith, Contract




less, but who lack experience.10 3 Because county courts exercise
discretion over funds that come from the county budget, state fi-
nancing would remove pressure from a judge trying to balance the
demands of tight-fisted county commissioners against the needs of
indigent defendants.
Minnesota has created a State Board of Public Defense, and
with the exception of Hennepin and Ramsey counties, each dis-
trict's budget is subject to the Board's scrutiny.'0 4 The Board ulti-
mately decides how much money to allocate to each district, but it
invites input from the county commissioners.' 0 5 As most people
candidly admit, funds for indigent defendants are not a high prior-
ity for public officials concerned with saving money and getting re-
elected.1 0 6 Because state judges must also seek re-election and
have frequent meetings with county commissioners to discuss fi-
nances, they too are subject to political pressures. Judges are
placed in the awkward position of carefully scrutinizing expendi-
tures while also deciding how much money to spend for indigent
defendants. Under these circumstances, judges should not exercise
discretion over investigative and expert services. This is especially




In 1985, the United States Supreme Court held that an indi-
gent defendant had been denied due process by the State of
Oklahoma when it refused to supply him with a psychiatrist dur-
ing his trial and sentencing' 0 7 Accused of first degree murder,
Glen Burton Ake had made a preliminary showing that his sanity
would be at issue during the trial. 0 8 So bizarre was Ake's behav-
ior during his arraignment, the trial judge, sua sponte, ordered
103. Id.
104. Minn. Stat. § 611.214 (1986).
105. Interview with Judge Kevin S. Burke, supra note 59.
106. One headline in a newspaper from Minnesota's Fifth Judicial District read,
"Commissioners Vow to Fight Proposed Budget Hike in Public Defender System."
New Ulm Journal, June 15, 1988, at Al, col. 1. The prime reason for the increase in
the budget was to add one full-time staff investigator. Id.
According to Richard Hilleren, Chief Public Defender of Minnesota's Eighth
Judicial District, county commissioners become angry when they feel they are los-
ing control over their budgets. He said the bottom line was that the commissioners
simply did not want to spend money on indigent defense services. Telephone inter-
view with Richard Hilleren (Apr. 14, 1988).
107. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
108. Id. at 72.
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him to be examined by a psychiatrist.10 9 At that time he was
found incompetent to stand trial, but with the aid of drugs he re-
covered sufficiently to stand trial six weeks later. 110 Although
Ake's lawyer showed that his client was indigent and intended to
rely on an insanity defense, the lower court refused to authorize
expert psychiatric assistance."'
The Supreme Court reversed the Court of Appeals affirm-
ance of the lower court.1 2 Justice Marshall, for the majority,
wrote:
We recognized long ago that mere access to the courthouse
doors does not by itself assure a proper functioning of the ad-
versary process, and that a criminal trial is fundamentally un-
fair if the State proceeds against an indigent defendant
without making certain that he has access to the raw materials
integral to the building of an effective defense. 113
In making its decision that an expert was essential to the de-
fense, the Court applied the three-prong balancing test set forth in
Mathews v. Eldridge.114 The Court first examined the private in-
terest affected by the state's action.115 This is the defendant's in-
terest in a fair trial and effective assistance of counsel. Second, the
Court analyzed the governmental interest in allowing the defend-
ant the additional safeguard of having an investigator or expert."
t 6
This is saving money. Third, the Court balanced state interests
against the risk of depriving the defendant of this safeguard.117
In Ake, Justice Marshall described the defendant's interest in
the accuracy of a criminal proceeding as "almost uniquely compel-
ling.""l8 Where the state and the defendant share an interest in
the accurate adjudication of a criminal trial, the government's fis-
cal interest in denying experts was deemed insubstantial. 119 Mar-
shall went on to examine the role of experts, such as psychiatrists,
in the courtroom and quoted one authority as saying that "modern
civilization, with its complexities of business, science, and the pro-
fessions, has made expert and opinion evidence a necessity."120
Although the Ake court did not specifically address the need
109. Id. at 71.
110. Id. at 72.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 74.
113. Id. at 77.
114. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
115. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 78.
119. Id. at 78-9.
120. Id. at 80.
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for other experts and investigators, language in the opinion sug-
gests that it has a more general application. Justice Marshall
wrote, "[w]hen a State brings its judicial power to bear on an indi-
gent defendant in a criminal proceeding, it must take steps to as-
sure that the defendant has a fair opportunity to present his
defense.' 121 Although investigators are not experts as defined by
Ake, thorough investigation is fundamental whenever an individ-
ual has been charged with a crime.122 Without investigative assist-
ance, a defendant may indeed be deprived of a fair opportunity to
present an effective defense.
A recent opinion by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
solved the question of whether the rule in Ake extends to non-psy-
chiatric experts. The case of Little v. Armontrout 123 involved the
use of hypnotically induced testimony during a rape trial. Months
after the assault, and with the aid of a police officer "expert" in
the art of hypnosis after a four-day training course, the victim was
able to identify the defendant Little as her assailant.124 After Lit-
tle was convicted, the appellate court remanded for a new trial be-
cause the trial court had denied a defense request for an expert in
hypnosis to attack the credibility of the police officer.125 About
Ake, the court said "[T]here is no principled way to distinguish be-
tween psychiatric and nonpsychiatric experts."126 As a result of
Little, courts may not selectively exclude fields of expertise as
long as the expert opinion is relevant to the defense.127
B. Right to Confrontation
The United States Supreme Court has gradually developed a
framework for a defendant's right to confrontation under the sixth
amendment. 128 In Pointer v. Texas 12 9 the Court wrote, "It cannot
seriously be doubted at this late date that the right of cross-exami-
nation is included in the right of an accused in a criminal case to
confront the witnesses against him." 3 0 In that case, the victim of
121. Id. at 76.
122. Id.; Note, supra note 24, at 1338.
123. 835 F.2d 1240 (8th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S.Ct. 2857 (1988).
124. Id. at 1241-42.
125. Id. at 1245.
126. Id. at 1243.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
415 (1986); Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973).
129. 380 U.S. 400 (1965). The Court held that the confrontation clause of the
sixth amendment applies to the states through the due process clause of the four-
teenth amendment.
130. Id. at 404.
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a robbery identified Pointer as the robber during a preliminary
hearing at which he had no lawyer. At the trial, the transcript of
the eyewitness identification was introduced into evidence because
the witness was unavailable. Pointer's conviction was reversed by
the Court because he was deprived of his sixth amendment right
to cross-examine his accuser. 131 From Pointer we learn that cross-
examination lies at the heart of the confrontation clause, but the
case does not specify the depth of preparation necessary to conduct
an effective cross-examination.
Wigmore once referred to cross-examination as "...the great-
est legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth."132 It can
only be effective, however, when the lawyer has engaged in metic-
ulous preparation and knows exactly the information he needs to
extract from a witness to support the defense theory of the case.
When lawyers represent clients without access to investigative and
expert resources they operate at a considerable disadvantage and
their clients may be deprived of certain constitutional rights. If
this happens because a judge unreasonably refuses to authorize
funds available under supporting service statutes, or the statute re-
stricts the money to an unrealistic amount, the defendant's four-
teenth and sixth amendment rights may be violated.
VI. Alternatives
The specific monetary limits are certainly one problem with
these statutes, but the amount of money available is irrelevant if
the defense lawyer fails to meet the judge's criteria for a threshold
showing of need. Although appellate courts say they prefer a lib-
eral interpretation of the statutes, rarely do they reverse convic-
tions for the denial of expert funds. As a result, judges may
routinely turn down requests for investigators and experts without
fear of appellate disapproval. Often, lawyers who appear in front
of these judges stop asking for money and represent indigent cli-
131. Id. at 400. See also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973). Because of
Mississippi's voucher rule, under which lawyers could not impeach their own wit-
nesses, Chambers was not allowed to cross-examine his witness who, after confess-
ing to the murder of which Chambers was accused, repudiated his confession on the
stand. The Court held that cross-examination was implicit in the constitutional
right of confrontation, and while it did not specifically discuss those resources es-
sential to cross-examiniation, it emphasized that effective confrontation was neces-
sary to "assure the accuracy of the truth-determining process." Id. at 295 (quoting
Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 89 (1970)). Justice Powell wrote of the right to con-
front and cross-examine: "[Its] denial or significant dimunition calls into question
the ultimate 'integrity of the fact-finding process' and requires that the competing
interests be closely examined." 410 U.S. at 295 (citing Berger v. California, 393 U.S.
314, 315 (1969)).
132. 5 Wigmore, Evidence § 1367 (3d ed. 1940).
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ents without the benefit of supporting services. When this hap-
pens, a defendant may be represented by a lawyer ill-prepared to
try the case. To avoid this problem, supporting service statutes
need to be rewritten.
Some argue that the statutes would be more effective if the
criteria set forth to determine what is "necessary" were more ex-
plicit. Current statutory language is ambiguous and leads to varied
interpretations. The Supreme Court's due process constitutional
analysis is also ambiguous. The Ake court interpreted the consti-
tution to require an investigator or expert when the defendant's
sanity would be a significant factor at trial.133 The Court failed,
however, to sufficiently explain what it meant by a "significant
factor." To obtain an expert or investigator after Ake, the defense
lawyer must convince the judge, well before trial, that a "signifi-
cant factor" does exist.
At least two problems exist with this interpretation of the
statute. First, significance is determined on a case-by-case basis
and, as always, what is significant to one judge may be a "fishing
expedition" to another.134 Second, lawyers often send out exper-
ienced investigators or consult experts hoping to uncover a rele-
vant issue over which there can be a trial. One prominent
criminal defense lawyer hires an investigator for any case that
might be tried.135 He said he often tells his experienced investiga-
tors to look into a case to see if they can find a relevant issue. 136 If
private defense lawyers contact investigators to uncover significant
issues, it hardly seems fair to require an indigent to find a signifi-
cant issue before consulting an investigator.
Other courts engage in a different analysis. Under what is re-
ferred to as an "equal protection" test, the court will provide an
investigator or expert where, under similar circumstances, one
would be retained by a private client.137 Various federal courts use
this test to apply the "necessary for an adequate defense" language
in section 3006A(e) of the Criminal Justice Act.138 Several state
courts have adopted this test as well. In Commonwealth v.
Lockley,139 the Massachusetts Supreme Court held that "[t]he test
133. Ake, 470 U.S. at 68.
134. Note, supra note 24, at 1357.
135. Interview with Joseph S. Friedberg, in Minneapolis, Minnesota (Feb. 23,
1988). Friedberg is credited with being one of the best criminal defense lawyers in
Minnesota. Steven F. Haifeh & Gregory White Smith, The Best Lawyers In
America (1987).
136. Interview with Friedberg, supra note 135.
137. Note, supra note 24, at 1358.
138. Id. at 1358-59.
139. 408 N.E.2d 834 (Mass. 1980).
[Vol. 6:247
1988] LIBERTY, JUSTICE... AND EXPERTS FOR ALL 267
is whether the item is reasonably necessary to prevent the party
from being subjected to a disadvantage in preparing or presenting
his case adequately, in comparison with one who could afford to
pay for the preparation which the case reasonably requires."' 4 0
The court pointed out that an indigent defendant is not entitled to
every supporting service that might be obtained by a defendant
with unlimited resources.141 The indigent defendant need not
show, however, that the service would necessarily change the final
outcome of the case. 142 This test may seem fair, but judges still re-
tain considerable discretion to decide whether they think a paying
client would consult an investigator or expert. In any event, an al-
ternative that gives judges discretion can, and will be, abused by
some of them.
One solution would allow defense lawyers to obtain investiga-
tors and experts on their own initiative and give the county the op-
portunity to challenge the expenditure after the trial. When the
county feels that an expense is frivolous, it can assume the burden
to prove to the judge that the investigator or expert was not neces-
sary for an effective defense. If the judge rules that the expendi-
ture was frivolous, the bill will be disallowed. When there are
insufficient funds in the district's budget to pay the bill, the expert
or investigator would not be paid. With this alternative, defense
lawyers would be careful because they know that money spent
frivolously will come out of their budgets. If experts or investiga-
tors are not paid, they will never work for the defense again.
Since finding qualified investigators and experts is often difficult,
defense lawyers will try not to lose them. The problem remains,
however, that the final decision on what is necessary rests with the
judiciary. Once the county learns that judges will be sympathetic
to their complaints, they will not hesitate to challenge
expenditures.
A second alternative would allow an independent third party
to exercise discretion over the defense's use of investigators and
experts. In Minnesota, the State Board of Public Defense might be
given the authority to allocate funds. Even the use of a third
party, however, does not completely eliminate the problem be-
cause the indigent's lawyer is still subject to outside scrutiny by
someone potentially subject to political and fiscal pressures, while
privately retained lawyers are not.
The most effective solution would be to remove judicial dis-




cretion completely. This solution is particularly viable because of
its simplicity, according to one commentator, and attractive "for its
potential for eliminating abuse by courts bent on denying assist-
ance."143 Public defenders could hire full-time staff investigators
and have sufficient funds in their budgets to retain experts, effec-
tively removing federal and state statutes as barriers to the proper
representation of indigent defendants. A proposal by the Minne-
sota State Board of Public Defense at the 1988 legislative session
would have provided state funding for experts, but the bill did not
pass.144 According to the Chair of the Board, funding for indigent
defendants was simply not a high priority for the legislature.145
The Board had requested $167,000 for a state fund from which in-
vestigators and experts could be compensated.146 Without this ad-
ditional money, the districts will continue to struggle to finance
investigators and experts. Until the state chooses to finance indi-
gent defense systems, the Board must approve budget increases so
that each district can afford to hire investigators and experts.
VII. Conclusion
In the historic decision Gideon v. Wainwright,147 the United
States Supreme Court held that due process obligated the states to
provide indigent felony defendants with competent counsel.
Twenty-two years later, the Court ruled that the right to a state-
supplied expert in certain situations was an essential component of
the defense.148 It should not take two more decades for the Court
to recognize that statutes limiting investigative and expert services
to indigents through judicial discretion and strict monetary ceil-
ings deprive them of their fourteenth and sixth amendment rights.
If Learned Hand's commandment is to mean anything, indigents
should have the right to effective assistance of investigators and
experts in the preparation of their defenses.
143. Note, supa note 24, at 1361.
144. Telephone interview with Hennepin County District Court Judge Kevin S.
Burke (Apr. 28, 1988).
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
148. Ake, 470 U.S. at 83.
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Ala. Code § 15-12-45 (1982) (administrative
director of courts may approve expenditures
for investigators and other expenses).
Alaska Stat. § 18.85.100 (1986) (indigent person
is entitled to be represented by an attorney to
the same extent as a person retaining a private
attorney, including investigation and other
preparation).
Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 13-4013 (1978) (when
charged with a capital offense, an indigent is
entitled to investigators and experts reasonably
necessary to present an adequate defense).
Ark. Stat. Ann. § 16-87-107 (1987) (public
defenders' expenses, including experts and
investigators, shall be paid by the counties in
amounts approved by the courts).
Cal. Penal Code § 987.2 (West 1985 & Supp.
1988) (the court shall determine the amount of
compensation for necessary expenses to be paid
out of the general fund of the county).
Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-1-403 (1986) (an indigent is
entitled to supporting services at state expense
after demonstrating a particularized and
reasonable need).
Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 51-292 (West 1958)
(reasonable expenses shall be paid from the
budget of the Public Defense Services
Commission, upon approval by the
commission).
Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, § 4603 (1983) (the public
defender may appoint investigators and other
assistants as necessary to conduct an adequate
defense).
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 914.06 (West 1985 & Supp.
1988) (when an indigent requires the services
of an expert witness whose opinion is relevant
to the issues of the case, the court shall award
reasonable compensation to be paid by the
county).
Ga. Code Ann. § 17-12-5 (1982) (the county
must pay for necessary expenses approved by
the court, including costs of investigation).
Haw. Rev. Stat. § 802-7 (1985) (the court may
direct that investigatory and expert services be
provided upon a showing that they are














Idaho Code § 19-861 (1987) (the public defender
may employ investigators and other persons
necessary to carry out the responsibilities of
the office).
Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, para. 113-3(d) (Smith-
Hurd 1977 & Supp. 1988) (in capital cases the
court may order the county treasurer to pay
necessary expert witnesses reasonable
compensation, not to exceed $250 for each
defendant).
Ind. Code Ann. § 33-9-10-4 (Burns 1985) (the
county counsel shall appropriate an amount
sufficient to meet the contract obligations of
the court for services to the poor).
Iowa Code Ann. § 331.777 (West 1983) (the
public defender may appoint investigators and
other employees as approved by the board).
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-4508 (1981 & Supp. 1987)
(counsel may obtain investigative, expert or
other services necessary to an adequate defense
in an ex parte hearing).
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 31-110 (Michie/Bobbs-
Merrill 1985) (an indigent is entitled to
necessary services, including investigation and
other preparation).
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 15, § 810 (1964).
Md. Ann. Code art. 27A, § 3 (1957) (with the
approval of the board of trustees, the public
defender shall appoint necessary personnel
such as investigators and experts).
Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 280, § 4 (Law. Co-op.
1980) (costs of indigent defense may be waived
by the court or paid by the Commonwealth).
Mich. Comp. Laws Ann. § 768.20(a) (West 1982
& Supp. 1988) (at the expense of the county,
the defense may secure an independent
psychological evaluation by a doctor of choice
on the issue of insanity).
Minn. Stat. Ann. § 611.21 (1986) (counsel may
obtain investigative, expert or other services
necessary to an adequate defense in an ex parte
hearing).
Miss. Code Ann. § 99-15-17 (1972 & Supp. 1987)
(expenses may be approved by judge and paid
by the county in which the prosecution
commenced).
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Mo. Rev. Stat. § 600.040 (Vernon 1978) (the
state shall pay all expenses incurred in the
performance of the duties of personnel in the
office of the public defender).
Mont. Code Ann. § 3-5-901 (1987) (the state
shall fund the expense of indigent defense).
Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-1804.12 (1985) (court shall
allow expenses reasonably necessary to an
effective defense).
Nev. Rev. Stat. § 260.040 (1986) (the public
defender may appoint investigators and other
employees necessary to carry out the
responsibilities of the office).
N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 604.A:6 (1986) (upon
finding that investigative, expert, or other
services are necessary to an adequate defense,
the court shall determine reasonable
compensation not to exceed three hundred
dollars).
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:158A-7 (West 1985) (the
public defender shall appoint investigators and
other personnel required for the operation of
the office).
N.M. Stat. Ann. § 31-16-3 (1984) (an indigent
person is entitled to be represented by a lawyer
to the same extent as a person having his own
counsel and to be provided with necessary
services, including investigation and other
preparation).
N.Y. County Law § 722-c (McKinney 1972 &
Supp. 1988) (court must find investigator or
expert necessary in an ex parte hearing).
N.C. Gen. Stat. § 7A-450 (1987) (it is the
responsibility of the state to provide an
indigent with counsel and other necessary
expenses of representation).
N.D. Cent. Code § 29-07.01.1 (1974) (an indigent
is entitled to expenses necessary for an
adequate defense when approved by the court).
Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2941.51 (Anderson 1987)
(this statute, which provides for attorney's fees,
is interpreted by the courts to include expenses
for defense experts. O'Mally v. Layden, 702
P.2d 1055 (Okla. Crim. App. 1985)).














R.I. Gen. Laws § 12-15-7 (1981) (the general
assembly shall appropriate annually a sum
deemed necessary for expenses incurred by the
public defender in performance of his duties).
S.C. Code Ann. § 17-3-80 (Law. Co-op. 1976 &
Supp. 1987) (subject to approval by the trial
judge, lawyers representing indigents may be
reimbursed for necessary expenses).
S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 7-16A-6 (1981) (the
board of county commissioners may employ
investigators and other persons that the
advisory committee considers necessary).
Tenn. Code Ann. § 8-14-103 (Supp. 1987)
(statute creates a district investigator).
Tex. Crim. Proc. Ann. § 26.05 (Vernon 1966)
(counsel shall be reimbursed for reasonable
investigative and expert expenses with prior
court approval).
Utah Code Ann. § 77-32-1 (1982 & Supp. 1987)
(indigents must be provided with investigators
and other personnel necessary for a complete
defense).
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 13, § 5254 (1974 & Supp.
1988).
Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-163 (1983 & Supp. 1988)
(the circuit or district court shall direct
payment of reasonable expenses incurred by a
court appointed attorney).
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 36.26.060 (Supp. 1988)
(the public defender may appoint necessary
investigators and other employees, subject to
the approval of the board of county
commissioners).
W.Va. Code § 29-21-14 (1986) (eligible public
defender shall be reimbursed for investigative
services and expert witnesses to a maximum of
$500 unless court approves additional
compensation).
Wyo. Stat. § 7-6-104 (1977) (an indigent person
is entitled to the necessary services of
representation, including investigation and
other preparation).
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